Korean society had adopted the draft system for several decades, and more careful analysis of military personnel procurement system is needed.
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Few public policy issues have been as divisive as how to procure military manpower.
The debate was particularly vociferous in the US in late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1969 President Nixon established the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, commonly known as the Gates Commission, to study the issue. The commission listed nine arguments against an AVF. Specifically, an AVF would (1) be too costly; (2) be too inflexible in times of crisis; (3) undermine patriotism by lessening the belief that each citizen has a moral responsibility to serve the country; (4) become an elitist institution that might threaten democratic values; (5) be racially unrepresentative, (6) be a mercenary force; (7) encourage foreign military adventurism; (8) be less effective because only low-ability personnel would e attracted to service; and (9) crowd out other defense spending, thereby eroding the quantity and quality of defense.
According to Presidential Commission on All Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1969 strong points are 1. Draft imposes a discriminatory tax on recruits equal to the difference between market wages and military wage 2. Below-market pricing under the draft leads to a military with too many recruits 3. All volunteer approach attracts those recruits with the lowest opportunity costs and secure a given number of recruits at less cost Weak points are 1. AVF is too costly 2. Be too inflexible in crisis 3. Undermine patriotism by lessening belief that each citizen has a moral responsibility to serve country 4. Become an elitist institution that might threaten democratic value 5. Racially unrepresentative 6. Be a mercenary force 7. Encourage foreign military adventurism 8. Crowd out other defense spending , eroding the quantity and duality of defense Advocates of a volunteer force, including most economists, countered by arguing that 4 the first criticism was wrong on theoretical grounds, and the other criticisms were weak on empirical grounds. On the cost issue, Milton Friedman, who wrote extensively for the public press on this subject and was himself a member of the Gates Commission, flatly stated in his December 19, 1966 Newsweek column that "the real cost of manning the armed forces now… is greater than the cost of manning a volunteer force of the same size because the volunteers would be the men who find military service the most attractive alternative." The report of the Gates Commission paved the way for the abolition of the US draft in 1973.
The argument that the all-volunteer army is cheaper than the draft because the former is far better at discriminating among low and high opportunity cost recruits lies at the heart of the opposition to the draft among economists. This argument is completely correct as far as it goes. Most economists have failed to recognize, however, that the opportunity cost advantage of the all-volunteer approach over the draft varies with the percentage of the eligible population that is recruited. When only a small proportion of eligible recruits are actually recruited, then a significant advantage is realized from the approach that most effectively selects out for military service those with the lowest opportunity cost. However, as the number of recruits approaches the number of those who are eligible for service, the advantage of identifying the lowest opportunity cost recruit diminishes. In the limit, when all eligible recruits are recruited, there is obviously no difference between the draft and the all-volunteer approach in terms of the opportunity cost of those in the military.
If the only cost of recruiting military personnel were the opportunity cost of those personnel, then, except in the limiting case of universal service, the standard economic argument in favor of the all-volunteer approach has to recognize that the salary associated with the former is typically less than that associated with the latter. The salary paid under the draft is determined administratively and need not vary with an increase in the number of military recruits. Under the all-volunteer approach, assuming that the military labor supply curve is upward sloping, the average salary must rise with military recruitment.
If the revenues needed to pay military salaries could be treated simply as a transfer from the general taxpayer to military personnel, then the difference between salaries under the draft and the all-volunteer approach would, in terms of efficiency, be without significance.
Unfortunately, taxes distort economic choices which impose dead-weight losses on the 5 economy and represent a genuine social cost. Therefore, because the wage bill is greater, and rises more rapidly, under the all-volunteer system than under the draft, the social cost of acquiring the tax revenue necessary to finance the former is greater than that necessary to finance the latter.
It follows that the total cost of the all-volunteer approach, consisting of the opportunity cost of the recruits and the dead-weight loss from raising the tax revenue to pay the recruits, is greater than the total cost of the draft when all of those eligible are recruited In addition to Friedman, a number of economists have contributed to the draft-AVF debate [see, e.g., Oi(1967) , Altman and Fechter(1967) , Hansen and Weisbrod(1967 ), Miller(1968 ), and Fisher(1969 ]. Lee and McKenzie(1992) recently laid out the most cogent framework to date for thinking about the cost issue.
The next chapter presents two economic theory of the draft versus AVF using the Lee and McKenzie framework and then it briefly considers some of the other points in the debate.
Ⅲ. Model: Lee and McKenzie
By employing some simplifying assumption of Lee and McKenzie model, though not implausible assumptions, the point of cost equivalency between the all-volunteer approach and the draft can be approximated.
Crucial to the efficiency advantage economists see in the all-volunteer approach is an upward sloping labor supply (or marginal opportunity cost) curve of military recruits. In order to make it possible to derive specific values for the point of cost equivalency between the all-volunteer approach and the draft, the labor supply curve is represented by the linear
Where MOCA denotes the marginal opportunity cost of recruits under the all-volunteer 6 system, a and b are both positive constants, and n is the number of recruits. While (1) determines the wage required for all possible levels of recruitment into the all-volunteer force, under the draft any wage can be set and held constant for any level of conscription between 0 and N, where N is the total number in the population eligible for military service.
In comparing the cost of the draft with that of the all-volunteer approach, we consider first only the opportunity cost o f those who are recruited. The opportunity cost of recruiting n people into an all-volunteer force is obtained by integrating (1) 
Determine the opportunity cost of conscripting n people into the military requires an assumption about the means of selection. For purpose of our analysis, a lottery draft is assumed in which the order people are chosen from the eligible population is random.
Therefore the expected marginal opportunity cost of obtaining recruits under the draft is,
given the supply curve (1), equal to the average of the lowest opportunity cost, a, and the highest opportunity cost, a + bN, or the constant,
We appeal to the law of large numbers and proceed under the assumption that the actual marginal opportunity cost of the draft is also given by (3). We can now express the total opportunity cost of obtaining n recruits under the draft as
It is immediate that (2) and (4) are equal when n=N. Obviously there is no difference between the all-volunteer approach and the draft in terms of the opportunity cost of the recruits when everyone in the eligible population is recruited.
To complete our cost comparison of the all-volunteer approach and the lottery draft we consider next the dead-weight loss associated with raising the tax revenue to finance the two systems. Again, a simplifying assumption is helpful. Although it is well known that 7 the marginal dead-weight loss of a tax increases with the amount of revenue raised, we assume that the dead-weight loss is a constant function of the revenue raised to pay recruits.
This assumption seems reasonable, if not completely accurate, given that 1) the money necessary to pay recruits under either system is a relatively small portion of total tax revenue, and 2) the tax revenue to pay recruits is raised by several different taxes.
In determining the total tax revenue required to pay for recruits under the allvolunteer approach, we assume that the military does not engage in salary discrimination.
Therefore, the salary received by all recruits increases in accordance with (1), as n increases, with the total wage bill given by an + bn² (5) Letting the ratio of the dead-weight loss to the tax revenue raised be given by the positive constant, β, then the dead-weight loss associated with n recruits in the all-volunteer force equals aβn + bβn² (6) Therefore, the total cost of obtaining n recruits with the all-volunteer approach is given by the sum of (2) and (6), or
With the constant wage, W, being paid to all conscripted recruits, the dead-weight loss associated with n such recruits equals Wβn.
The total cost of obtaining n recruits with the draft is equal to the sum of (4) and (8), or (a + Wβ)n + 1/2bNn.
In general the total cost of the all-volunteer approach, (7), is less than the total cost of the draft, (9), over some initial range of recruits, beyond which the situation is reversed.
Equating (7) and (9) and solving for n yields the "cost equivalent" number of recruits, which 8 is denoted n E , where
Of obvious interest are 1) the value of n E for reasonable parameter values, 2) the sensitivity of n E to changes in those parameter values, and 3) the relationship between the ratio n E /N yielded by our model under reasonable parameter values and the ratio of military recruits to the population of eligible recruits under wartime conditions. These issues are addressed in the next section.
In choosing values for the parameters in (10), relative magnitudes are, with one exception, more important than absolute magnitudes. An absolute value for the salaries of draftees, W, for example, has no meaning without specifying the length of time over which it applies. But by choosing a relative difference between w and the payment necessary to entice the lowest opportunity cost into the military, a, the value of one of these parameters can be chose arbitrarily with the relevant time interval being left to adjust appropriately. I assigning values for the parameters in the supply cure, a and b, and the military eligible population, N, the important assumption for our purpose concerns the difference between the payments necessary to attract the lowest opportunity cost individual and the highest opportunity cost individual into the military. Once this difference between the lowest and highest opportunity cost is specified, then two of the three parameters (a, b, N) can be arbitrarily chosen. The dead-weight loss parameter, β, on the other hand, has to be specified independently of other parameters in the model.
While recognizing the arbitrariness of the assumptions made about the relationships between the parameters in (10), it is our belief that plausible assumptions can be made.
Intuitively, one would expect that the larger the marginal dead-weight loss from raising tax revenue, β, the smaller the cost equivalent ratio of military recruits to the eligible population.
And indeed, taking the partial of n E , as expressed in (10), with respect to β, shows that n E does decline as β increases as long as W< a+bN (the payment to recruits under the draft is less than that necessary to entice the entire eligible population into the military). Also, as one would expect, and as is immediate from (10), the larger W the larger the number that has to be 9 recruited into the military before the draft becomes less costly than the all-volunteer system.
It can be shown also, given a plausible relationship between the parameters a and W, that the steeper the labor supply curve, everything else equal, the smaller n E . Taking the partial of (10) with respect to b yields
which is negative as long as W>a. This result implies that (holding constant the amount necessary to entice the least reluctant individual into the military, a, and the amount paid under the draft, W) a reduction in the elasticity of labor supply into the military reduces the number of recruits required to make the draft less costly than the all-volunteer approach.
Reducing the elasticity of labor supply increase the advantage of being able to distinguish between potential recruits on the basis of their opportunity cost; an advantage which explains why economists overwhelmingly favor the all-volunteer approach. But this advantage can be core than offset by the additional dead-weight loss associated the tax revenue differences between the draft and all-volunteer approaches, as the labor supply elasticity declines.
This suggests that the outbreak of war may increase the relative cost advantage of the draft quite apart from the fact that a larger percentage of the eligible population is recruited into the military during wartime. Crucial in this regard is whether the war is popular or unpopular. If the war is a popular one it may produce a patriotic response which increases the military labor supply elasticity and therefore increase the recruiting range over which the allvolunteer approach is less costly. On the other hand, an unpopular war can be expected to reduce the military labor supply elasticity and reduce the recruiting range over which the allvolunteer approach is less costly. If the imposition of the draft adds to the unpopularity of the war the result can be a stronger justification for the imposition of the draft.
Our assumption that the draft selects all recruits on the basis of an unbiased lottery expands the range over which the all-volunteer approach is less expend s the range over which the all-volunteer approach is less expensive than the draft. Modification that allows those most adverse to military service to obtain exemptions from the draft can reduce the cost of the draft and therefore reduce n E . This suggests that the more unfair the draft, at least as perceived by many, the more likely the draft is less costly than the all-volunteer approach.
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To this point our concern has been almost entirely with comparing the cost of securing a given number of military recruits under the alternatives of a lottery draft and all-volunteer enlistments. The information realized from this cost comparison would be sufficient to choose the most efficient recruiting alternative if the number recruited into the military were exogenously determined. In general, however, there is no requirement for a given number of recruits. Rather there is a demand curve for recruits which relate the marginal value of military recruits to the number that have been recruited. In this section we introduce such a demand curve into the analysis and examine the interrelated questions, 1) how many people is it efficient to recruit into the military, and 2) is the all-volunteer approach or the lottery draft the most efficient means of securing military recruits?
To begin we take the derivative of (7) and (9) with respect to n in order to determine, respectively, that the marginal cost of recruiting under the all-volunteer approach is
and that the marginal cost of recruiting under the draft is a + Wβ + bn/2 
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Given the marginal cost curve, the efficient number of recruits, along with the efficient recruiting approach, is determined by the demand curve. In many cases this determination is straight-forward. When the demand curve intersects only one segment of the marginal cost curve that intersection determines the efficient number of recruits, and the efficient method of recruiting. For example, if the demand curve is given by D 1 in Figure 1 , then the efficient number of recruits is given by n 1 and they are most efficiently recruited with the all-volunteer approach. If the demand curve is given by D 2 in Figure 1 , then the efficient number of recruits is given by n 2 and they are most efficiently recruited with the draft.
Number of Recruits where the all-volunteer approach is less costly than the draft and it intersects MC D at n' 3 where the draft is less costly than the all-volunteer approach. Once we determine which recruiting approach is most efficient, the efficient level of recruiting is determined by the intersection of D 3 with the appropriate marginal cost curve. The question, then, is whether the welfare surplus is greatest from the optimal use of the all-volunteer approach or from the optimal use of the draft. The answer is found by comparing the welfare loss from expanding recruitment from n 3 to n E with volunteer (given by the shaded area A in Figure 2 ) with the welfare gain from expanding recruitment from n E to n' 3 with draftees (given by the shaded are B in Figure 2 ). As constructed, area A is slightly larger than area B and efficiency calls for n 3 military recruits in an all-volunteer force.
The possibility exists that the demand curve intersects both MC A and MC D in such a way that obtaining the efficient number of recruits with the all-volunteer approach provides the same net gain as obtaining the efficient number of recruits with the draft. Such a case is shown in Figure 2 where the shaded areas A and B are of equal size. As the demand and marginal cost curves are constructed in Figure2, it is equally efficient to recruit n 1 volunteers
Number of Recruits 13 into the military, or to draft n 2 . The implication of this multiple optimum is that a small increase in the demand for military personnel can result in a discontinuous jump in the efficient number of personnel along with a shift from the all-volunteer approach to the draft as the most efficient method of recruiting. As demand increases through D in Figure 2 , the efficient number of recruits jumps from n 1 to n 2 . Such an increase in demand through D could result from a parallel shift in the demand curve, or from the demand for recruits becoming less elastic by pivoting clock-wise around its horizontal intercept. A reduction in the demand elasticity and an increase in demand for military personnel is what one would expect with the onset of war. Therefore, wartime conditions alter demand conditions for military recruits in ways that increase the likelihood that the draft is preferred to the all-volunteer approach on efficiency grounds.
As can be easily seen from Figure 2 , unless the demand for military recruits is completely inelastic, it is never efficient to recruit a number equal to that which equalizes the cost of the two alternative recruiting methods, and the shift to the draft always finds it efficient to experience a jump in the number of recruits. This jump in recruits is consistent with the standard view of economists which faults the draft for motivating more military recruitment than is efficient because it allows personnel to be obtained for less than full cost.
In our model, however, it is precisely because the draft allows military personnel to be obtained for less than full cost, thereby motivating a jump in the number recruited, that explains why the draft can be more efficient than the all-volunteer approach.
IV. Discussion and Implications
The above model implies that the procurement system of military personnel should be selected considering the costs and benefits of draft system. Korean society had adopted the draft system for several decades, and more careful analysis of military personnel procurement system is needed for the following reasons:
First, since the growth rate of Korean economy is slowing down, potential unemployment is increasing, which can be a destabilizing factor in Korean society. Expanded opportunity of military career for unemployed can be a solution for Korean society. defense of the country, and a different mix of military personnel with professional experience and background is needed.
Third, the draft system contributed to the savings of government budget, and the change of system can increase the burden of military budget. But it can be counter balanced with the savings in social budget. More careful analysis of implication on government budget needs to be examined carefully. This paper set the ground of discussion on military personnel issues, and it needs more empirical research to determine whether the military personnel system needs changes in Korean society in the near future..
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